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Summary
This paper presents an overview of the reasons why unregulated markets for the
production of electricity cannot be expected to invest sufficiently in generation capacity
on a continuous basis. Although it can be shown that periodic price spikes should
provide generation companies with sufficient investment incentives in theory, there are
a number of probable causes of market failure. A likely result is the development of
investment cycles that may affect the adequacy of capacity. The experience in
California shows the great social costs associated with an episode of scarce generation
capacity. Another disadvantage is that generation companies can manipulate price
spikes. This would result in large transfers of income from consumers to producers and
reduce the operational reliability of electricity supply during these price spikes. We end
this paper by outlining several methods that have been proposed to stabilise the market,
which provide better incentives to generation companies and consumers alike.
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1 Introduction 
This paper addresses the question whether liberalised electricity markets tend to invest in 
generation capacity in a sufficient and timely manner, so that the chance of electricity 
shortages and the resulting service interruptions remain near the social optimum. There is no 
scientific consensus whether liberalised electricity markets can be expected to produce 
adequate capacity levels on a continuous basis. Although there are some cases, most notably 
California, in which a liberalised market appears to produce insufficient investment in 
generation capacity, practical experience is too limited and the available cases are far too 
convoluted by factors such as flawed market design or regulatory restrictions to provide 
convincing empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the social cost of capacity shortages is so high 
that a thorough analysis of the issue is available.  
Caramanis et al. show that under ideal conditions, electricity spot markets provided efficient 
outcomes in both the short and the long term (Caramanis, 1982; Caramanis et al., 1982). This 
theory still stands; the question is whether it applies in practice or whether real market 
conditions deviate too much from the ideal situation. The belief that unregulated markets in 
electricity generation can produce an optimal outcome in the long term is widely shared (see 
Shuttleworth, 1997 and Hirst & Hadley, 1999). Generally, this school of thought asserts that 
underinvestment would be caused by obstacles to the proper functioning of the market 
mechanism, such as price restrictions or construction permits. The proper course of action, in 
this view, is to improve the investment climate by eliminating all extraneous sources of risk, 
such as regulatory risk and other obstacles to investment. 
The lack of scientific agreement about the issue is reflected in the differences among existing 
electricity markets. Spain and a number of South American systems try to stimulate 
investment in generation capacity by providing payments for generation capacity (in addition 
to their revenues from the sale of electricity) (Vázquez et al., 2002). Three systems on the US 
East Coast – the Pennsylvania New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) system, the New York Power 
Pool and the New England Power Pool – use a system of capacity requirements to ensure 
there always is a certain reserve margin (PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 2001; for an 
introduction, see Besser et al., 2002). Most European systems, on the other hand, have no 
specific provisions to ensure the adequacy of capacity. Instead, they rely on the electricity 
market to provide the incentive for investment. They can be characterised as energy-only 
markets, as the (expected) price of electric energy is the only driver for capacity investment. 
We present arguments that cast doubt on the ability of unregulated markets to provide for the 
security of supply. A number of factors make it plausible that real markets do not follow the 
theory of spot pricing.                                                                                                                                                                                 3 
2  The narrow investment optimum 
Electricity markets have a different dynamic from other markets because of three 
characteristics: 
  Electricity is a strongly time-limited product. It cannot be stored, other than in pumped-
hydro facilities, in a commercially viable way. Nevertheless, the electricity supply system 
can only function in a stable manner if supply and demand are continuously balanced. 
  The supply of electricity is only partially characterised by a gradually increasing 
marginal-cost function. When all available generation units are producing electricity, no 
marginal increase is possible in the short term. As a result, the marginal-cost curve ends 
with a perfectly price-inelastic section. 
  The demand for electricity also is highly inelastic. This inelasticity may be caused by the 
fact that there is no readily available alternative for most applications of electricity. 
Another factor that is at least as important is that few consumers receive the required price 
information in time to adjust their behavior. Moreover, electricity consumption is usually 
measured over long periods, so consumers have no incentive to shift consumption from 
peak hours to off-peak hours. As a result, few consumers adjust their electricity 
consumption to the current price of electricity, so that the observed price-elasticity of 
consumers is extremely low. There are multiple experiments aimed at increasing 
consumer price-elasticity, but in most electricity systems their impact still is small 
(Nilssen & Walther, 2001; Roberts & Formby, 2001; Sæle & Grønli, 2001). 
The combination of these three characteristics is the reason that most mechanisms that aid the 
clearing of other markets, such as a delay in the delivery of the good, consumers switching to 
other goods or higher prices leading to a reduction in demand, are not available in current 
electricity markets. This situation has significant consequences: first, wholesale electricity 
prices are highly volatile; second, there is a chance of service interruptions. 
With some modifications, the theory of spot pricing still holds, even if demand is assumed to 
be completely inelastic. The main consequence of demand price-elasticity being insufficient is 
that there is a risk that the market does not clear – obviously revealed in the case that there is 
not physically enough generation capacity available to meet demand. At this point, the market 
does not reach price equilibrium and some load will need to be shed. The cost of installing so 
much capacity that the chances of load-shedding could be reduced to zero would thus exceed 
the social costs of the load-shedding, which are to be avoided. 
Nevertheless, if the market does not clear, it may be necessary to institute a price cap to 
protect consumers against overcharging (e.g., Ford, 1999; Hobbs et al., 2001c; Stoft, 2002). If 
consumers are not involved in real-time price setting, they may otherwise find themselves 
paying more for electricity than their value of lost load. This price cap needs to be determined 
carefully, as it affects the attractiveness of investment in generation capacity. The price cap 
needs to equal the average value of lost load (VOLL), because at this price consumers should, 
on average, be indifferent about whether they receive electricity or not. Stoft (2002) shows 
that in a perfectly competitive market, this results in an optimal level of investment in 
generation capacity, with an optimal duration of power interruptions. Therefore, the theory of 
spot pricing still is valid, even if demand is fully inelastic. Price caps can be problematic, 
however, because it is difficult to determine the optimal level, as the value of lost load is 
difficult to measure (Willis & Garrod, 1997; Ajodhia et al., 2002). 4  
 
Although theoretically sound, the reliance upon periodical price spikes to signal the need for 
peaking capacity has some significant weaknesses. To begin with, there is the risk that the 
price cap is set at the wrong level, resulting in over or underinvestment. There are, however, 
issues that are more fundamental. The first is that investment in peak generation units is quite 
risky, so that small distortions of the investment signal may have large consequences. The 
second is the argument that there is a positive externality associated with investment in 
peaking units, because the security of supply is a public good (owing to the network character 
of electricity supply). The third factor is the inevitable development of market power during 
periods of supply scarcity. These issues are addressed in the next sections. 
3 Market  failure 
Now we discuss a number of factors that may disturb the narrow investment optimum. The 
following types of market failure can be discerned (based, in part, upon Hobbs et al., 2001b): 
  price restrictions, 
  imperfect information, e.g. regarding consumer willingness to pay or future supply and 
demand, 
  regulatory uncertainty, 
  regulatory restrictions to investment, and 
  risk-averse behavior by investors. 
Price restrictions 
The fact that a price cap may be needed to protect consumers against overcharging in times of 
scarcity represents a significant risk, because the optimal level of the price cap is difficult to 
determine. Although the theory is clear that the price cap needs to be equal to the value of lost 
load, there are many methods of measuring the value of lost load with widely varying 
outcomes (see for instance Willis & Garrod, 1997 and Ajodhia et al., 2002). The cost of erring 
is high. A price cap that is not equal to the value of lost load likely results in a sub-optimal 
level of investment in generation capacity. 
Imperfect information 
Producers lack the information needed for socially optimal investment decisions (Hobbs et al., 
2001b; Stoft, 2000). This increases the investment risk and therefore reduces the willingness 
to invest.  In order to calculate the probability that peak units will operate and to calculate the 
expected return on investment, generating companies need to know both the stochastic 
distribution of the demand function (so they know the distribution of the frequency, duration 
and height of price spikes) and the expected development of total available capacity (Hobbs et 
al., 2001a). The exact characteristics of the demand function are difficult to estimate, 
especially in newly liberalised markets for which no long-term sequences of empirical data 
are available. Moreover, the basic characteristics of demand change over time (for instance 
because of the introduction of new technologies), which reduces the validity of demand 
functions based upon historical data.                                                                                                                                                                              5 
Regulatory uncertainty 
Regulatory uncertainty increases investment risk and therefore adversely influences the 
willingness to invest. Regulatory uncertainty can be considered as a negative externality 
associated with changes in public policy. Especially in newly liberalised markets such as most 
electricity markets, regulatory uncertainty can be a significant factor. Consider, for example, a 
few of the policy changes that are currently underway in Europe: 
  On 25 November 2002, the European Council on Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy reached political agreement on amendments to the electricity and gas Directives 
and a regulation for electricity (EC, 2002). 
  The European gas market is in the middle of a liberalisation process. Most notably the 
development of the gas transport-tariff system, including charges for flexibility and 
imbalance penalties, is highly uncertain. This has a considerable impact on a business plan 
involving today’s state-of-the-art, gas-fuelled generators. 
  Additionally, there is uncertainty about future European Union environmental rules, such 
as cooling water regulations or the specifics of the proposed CO2 emissions trading 
scheme (EC, 2001). 
A second source of regulatory uncertainty, with an equally significant impact upon the 
willingness to invest, exists with respect to the question of whether a period of high prices 
will give cause to the government or the regulator to implement a maximum price or, if a 
maximum already exists, to lower it. Volatile prices are not only a risk for investors, but also 
for regulators because of the public protests they give rise to. Most electricity systems start 
liberalisation with ample capacity. In fact, the desire to reduce excessive reserve margins was 
a motivation for liberalisation. If, after the initial excess capacity has disappeared, a period 
develops in which prices are many times higher than their historical levels, consumers may 
consider this a failure of liberalisation and demand intervention. Such events occurred in San 
Diego at the beginning of the crisis in California, when even a brief period of high consumer 
prices proved politically unacceptable (Liedtke, 2000). The political risk of being held 
responsible for high electricity prices, whether these are economically efficient or not, 
translates into a risk for investors of political intervention. Hence price volatility itself brings 
about regulatory risk, at least until sufficient experience has been gained with liberalised 
markets that investors know whether they should expect political or regulatory intervention or 
not (Oren, 2000; Newbery, 2001). 
Regulatory restrictions to investment 
Obstacles to obtaining the necessary permits may be another cause of underinvestment. 
Although the social benefits of a proper licensing process are not disputed here, it should be 
taken into account that they may incur negative side effects. First, the permitting process can 
be lengthy, thereby increasing the response time of generation investment to an increase in 
demand. Especially in a situation of incomplete information about the future development of 
supply and demand, this may contribute to investment risk. A second effect of increasing the 
lead-time for the construction of new plants is that it may contribute to investment cycles. 
This subject is further discussed below. A third effect of permits is that they may impose 
additional requirements on generators, leading to operational constraints to the response to 
market signals. An example is that cooling-water regulations may restrict operation during 
periods of hot weather.  6  
 
Risk aversion 
The theoretical approach by Caramanis et al. assumes that generating companies behave in a 
risk-neutral manner with respect to investment. This is not necessarily the case, especially 
when many risks themselves are not well understood. Given the many unquantifiable risks in 
a liberalised electricity market, it is not unlikely that investors in generation capacity choose a 
risk-averse strategy with respect to generation investment (Vázquez et al., 2002). If all 
investors do so, none of them lose market share, so the penalty is limited to a loss of sales 
during periods of supply shortage. Yet this loss of volume is small, when compared to the 
overall production of electricity and is likely to be more than compensated by the high prices 
that develop during a period of supply shortage. Therefore, a collective strategy of risk-averse 
investment behavior is beneficial to the generation companies, as long as this does not attract 
newcomers to the market. Such a risk-averse investment strategy would lead to less installed 
capacity than would be socially optimal. 
4  Reserve capacity characterised as a public good 
Another argument is that there is a positive externality associated with the provision of 
generation capacity and as a result, a competitive market will under-provide it. The existence 
of a chance of service interruptions is key to the existence of market failure in generation 
capacity, according to Jaffe & Felder (1996), because service interruptions are random. The 
more that generation capacity is available, the higher the reliability of the supply of electricity 
is. Therefore, they argue, the presence of generation capacity in excess of the capacity that is 
contracted by market parties (‘reserve capacity’) provides an additional benefit to all 
consumers of electricity in the form of higher reliability of service. 
This benefit to all users of the system is a positive external effect of the provision of capacity, 
as the owner of the generation capacity cannot charge consumers for increasing the reliability 
of service. As the added reliability is non-excludable and non-rival (the reliability of service 
to all consumers increases), the reserve capacity can be characterised as a public good. The 
same is true for the withdrawal of firm load: when a consumer reduces his/her load, system 
demand goes down and the chance of a shortage decreases. Withdrawal of load and the 
provision of additional capacity have the same positive external effect: they both increase 
system reliability. Because part of the socially optimal amount of generation capacity is a 
public good, liberalised electricity markets will tend towards an equilibrium volume of 
installed generation capacity that is lower than the social optimum. This analysis is 
corroborated by Pérez-Arriaga & Meseguer (1997), who consider generators to deliver three 
distinct products: energy, operating reserves and capacity reserves. This implies that when 
generators are not paid for their capacity reserves, they provide an external benefit. 
In market equilibrium, this positive externality would be reflected by consumers without 
revealing their true willingness to pay. If service interruptions are the consequence of, for 
instance, a 2% shortage of generation capacity, this means that service interruptions affect 
only about 2% of the customers at a time during a period of scarcity. (This is the maximum 
percentage of load that was disconnected during the crisis in California in 2001.) This means 
that each individual consumer can expect to be without electricity for 2% of the time that the 
shortage lasts. The consumers who caused the shortage by under-contracting therefore do not 
suffer the full consequences; instead, they still can consume as much electricity as they want 
for 98% of the time. In market equilibrium, this means that those consumers who show a 
lower willingness to pay benefit from those who show a higher willingness to pay and thereby                                                                                                                                                                                7 
attract more peak capacity. The public-good character of reserve capacity therefore provides 
consumers with an incentive to understate their willingness to pay. 
Counterargument 
This effect in principle could be offset by the phenomenon described in section 2, wherein 
prices may rise above consumers’ willingness to pay during periods of scarcity, depending on 
the level of the price cap. Therefore, if the price cap is set high enough, the average price over 
time should still be high enough to recover investment in peaking units. Nevertheless, Jaffe & 
Felder are right that during periods of ample generation capacity, the electricity price in an 
energy-only market does not include a premium for the availability of unused capacity; it 
merely reflects the marginal cost of production of the marginal unit. The combination of the 
fact that ordinary prices do not reflect the full social value of electricity, while scarcity prices 
may be too high, may lead towards a tendency of cyclical investment behavior. 
5 Investment  cycles 
A year before the California crisis started, Ford (1999) published a paper in which he used a 
computer model to show that investment in electricity generation facilities is inherently 
unstable in a system with rules such as those in California. His explanation is that investment 
is not aimed at dampening business cycles, which it would do if the right amount of new 
capacity became available at the right time, but at making a profit. Because investors tend to 
wait until they are reasonably certain that they can make a profit, and because they tend to 
overreact (in part because they do not know their competitors’ plans), Ford considers the 
interaction between the price signal that a power exchange provides and investment to be 
inherently unstable. 
Ford’s argument is essentially that a combination of risk-aversion and an insufficiently long 
time-horizon leads to a delay of investment. Because of the low elasticity of supply and 
demand, the price signal will not indicate scarcity until the capacity margin is so slim that the 
chance of service interruptions has become unacceptably large. The long lead-time for new 
investment means that, once a shortage has developed, this shortage becomes worse before it 
is alleviated with new generation capacity. Ford’s argument is reinforced by the argument 
from the previous section, that generation capacity is undervalued during periods of abundant 
supply and overvalued during periods of scarcity.  
Visudhiphan et al. (2001) contend that investment cycles are not inevitable, as long as 
investors are able to anticipate market developments. Nevertheless, as we saw above, 
sufficient information about future supply and demand is lacking. In their simulation, 
Visudhiphan et al. also find that backward-looking investment, that is, investment based upon 
recent experience in the market, will lead to investment cycles. Stoft (2002) arrives at the 
same conclusion. He notes that the distribution of price spikes may be such that investors 
would need to have a time horizon of several decades to determine the real average revenues 
from price spikes. If they use a shorter time-horizon, they are bound to overestimate or 
underestimate their expected revenues. 
6 Long-term  contracts   
The investment risk in peaking capacity could be greatly reduced by the use of long-term 
contracts. Moreover, long-term contracts would reveal the expected future demand for 
peaking capacity to generating companies, as the retail companies (who purchase power on 8  
 
behalf of their customers) would reveal their peak supply and demand when negotiating the 
contracts. This would improve the availability of information to generating companies and 
therefore reduce their investment risk. Long-term contracts would remove much of the price 
volatility, which is a risk for generators and consumers alike. An important additional benefit 
of long-term contracts for consumers would be the removal of the incentive to withhold 
capacity during periods of scarcity. So if there are so many benefits to long-term contracts to 
all involved parties, why are peaking units not covered by long-term contracts in practice? 
The answer is two-fold: 
  first, there is an opportunity for consumers to ‘free ride’ the system, and as a result, retail 
companies are discouraged from engaging in long-term contracts for peaking capacity; 
and 
  second, long-term contracts tend to have too short a duration to dampen the business 
cycle. 
Free-riding 
The opportunity for free-riding is caused by the fact that, to a large extent, generators do not 
sell their electricity directly to the final consumers but to retail companies that act as 
intermediaries. This situation creates an opportunity for free-riding by consumers (Neuhoff & 
De Vries, 2002), as follows. If long-term contracts are to provide an adequate signal to 
generators to install sufficient generation capacity, they must pay the generators the average 
cost of peaking capacity. During periods in which the peaking capacity is not used (which is 
most of the time), the spot market price will be below the cost of these contracts. Competitive 
spot-market prices reflect the marginal cost of production, which does not include capital 
cost. Retail companies that hold long-term, peak-load contracts will therefore have higher 
costs, as they contribute to financing the capital cost of the peaking unit. Since rational 
consumers, who are free to choose their retail company, generally choose the cheapest one, 
they will therefore normally prefer companies without long-term contracts for peaking 
capacity. Hence, retail companies will be reluctant to purchase long-term peak-load contracts 
during periods of ample generation capacity. 
Long-term contracts for peak load become attractive again to retail companies during periods 
of scarcity, but then the reverse effect takes place. The retail companies try to obtain average-
cost based, peak-load contracts from generators, as these are cheaper than spot prices. Yet the 
generators would then be unwilling to engage in these contracts, as they can sell their peak 
load for much higher prices in the spot market. Thus the fact that supply companies 
intermediate between generators and end-users creates an opportunity for free-riding by 
consumers, which discourages timely investment in peaking units. 
If retail companies were vertically integrated with production companies the dynamics would 
change, but the companies would still not receive a sufficient incentive to invest in peaking 
capacity. Now the reason is the public-good character of the security of supply, as mentioned 
above in section 4. Vertically integrated companies would still have an incentive to keep 
insufficient peaking capacity, because this would allow them to sell electricity at a lower price 
than competitors with a complete portfolio. Consumers who purchase electricity from a 
company with insufficient peaking capacity would be free-riding on consumers who 
purchased (more expensive) electricity from a company with a complete generation portfolio.                                                                                                                                                                              9 
Not long enough 
The second failure of long-term contracts is that they generally are not long enough (Ford, 
1999). Long-term contracts would need to extend beyond the current phase of the business 
cycle to cover at least the next phase in order to dampen the business cycle. The physical 
inertia of the electricity sector and the close relationship between demand growth and the 
general economy cause the business cycle of the electricity sector to be long, probably in the 
order of one or two decades. Because neither investors nor consumers have this long a time-
horizon, the contract length is generally shorter. The result is, however, that long-term 
contracts do not represent a true average price of electricity, and thus they tend to extend the 
current phase of the business cycle.  
Even if generating companies were to receive the appropriate long-term demand signals, there 
is a final problem with long-term contracts: the slow learning curve of consumers. The long 
time it takes to develop new capacity and the long life cycle of generating plants provides a 
serious obstacle to reaching an efficient equilibrium (Vázquez et al., 2000). If investment 
signals depend upon consumers entering into long-term contracts to hedge their risk of supply 
interruptions, consumers need to have the opportunity to learn how to find contracts that are 
attractive to them. As they would mainly learn through trial and error, this would require 
repeated periods of shortage and high prices. Owing to the length of the business cycle, 
consumers have few opportunities to learn how to find attractive contracts that hedge their 
risk of supply interruptions. Moreover, it is likely that each period of shortages will result in 
changes of the market rules by the regulator, so that the learning curve would need to start 
over.  
The result is that consumers will probably never learn to cover all of their future demand with 
long-term contracts, and thus electricity shortages will occur time and again and the market 
will never reach equilibrium. Even if end-consumers or their suppliers have a proper incentive 
to enter into long-term contracts for peaking capacity, it would take an unacceptably long 
time before they would know what their actual (long-term) needs are and how to negotiate 
these contracts. 
Even if consumers were to consider a long enough period to average the swings of the 
business cycle, the risk to generation companies of such contracts would probably be too 
large. In the course of several decades, the fuel markets are likely to change, generation 
technology and environmental regulations may change and the uncertainty about the 
development of demand is large. So here is the so-called ‘Catch-22’ of long-term contracts: a 
short time-horizon does not isolate the contracts sufficiently from the business cycle, while a 
long time-horizon carries too much risk. 
We may conclude that investors lack the incentive, the time horizon and the education to 
engage sufficiently in long-term contracts. Moreover, consumers have an option to free-ride. 
They also lack the time horizon and the required sophistication. Therefore, we may conclude 
that while long-term contracts may cover a significant portion of generation in a mature 
market, we cannot expect them to cover peak load capacity. Especially during a period of 
excess capacity and low prices, a shortage of long-term contracts for peaking capacity appears 
to be likely. Consequently, it is to be expected that this period of excess capacity is followed 
by a period of power shortages. 10  
 
7 Market  power 
When high price peaks occur, the incentive may be quite strong to withhold generation 
capacity from the market, as was demonstrated during the electricity crisis in California 
(Joskow & Kahn, 2002). When the capacity margin is slim, or when acute shortages already 
exist, the low price-elasticity of demand means that a small reduction in the supply of 
electricity may lead to steep price increases. In that case, even a small market share may 
provide enough market power to raise prices by keeping some generation capacity off the 
market. The temptation will be strong to withhold generation capacity, for instance by listing 
generating units as requiring unscheduled maintenance. 
Stoft (2002) points out that if the price cap is absent or very high, for instance equal to the 
value of lost load, the increase in profits from withholding can be so high that it becomes 
attractive even for small generators, who would have to withhold the majority of their 
generation capacity. As a result, many generating companies, not just the large ones, have 
market power during a period of scarcity. The increases in profit that result from withholding 
are large, while it is difficult to take judicial steps against this behavior (because one would 
have to prove which generators were withholding illegally for each hour during which the 
withholding occurred, and that these generators were not legitimately out-of-service). The 
attractive incentives to withhold capacity when it is needed most is a fundamental weakness 
of electricity markets that rely on price spikes to signal the need for investment, even in the 
absence of other forms of market failure. 
Aside from the chance of being caught for abuse of market power, the only disadvantage of 
this strategy, from the point of view of generating companies, is that withholding electricity 
during a period of scarcity may cause such a crisis that it prompts a complete overhaul of the 
market design, as it did in California. Therefore, an established oligopoly of large generators 
may choose a more stable, long-term strategy.
1 If generation companies are able to keep 
prices above the competitive level during normal market conditions, they may opt to 
overinvest in order to discourage new entrants. The presence of excess generation capacity 
would serve as a threat to new market participants, wherein the incumbents would be able to 
meet all demand, if necessary, at a price equal to the marginal cost of production. A second 
reason for an oligopoly to invest more than would appear to be economic could be that it 
would place an extra value upon reliability, because service interruptions would attract 
undesired (political) attention. Allowing an oligopoly to develop is hardly an attractive option, 
however, because it would undo many of the gains from liberalisation (Newbery, 2002). 
8  Trade among electricity systems 
An entirely different aspect of the issue is how to ensure generation capacity in the presence 
of significant volumes of trade among systems. In theory, trade among liberalised electricity 
systems should not change the basic market dynamics. If the involved systems are liberalised 
in similar ways, trade among them only represents a scale increase. The scale of the system 
does not affect the question of generation adequacy, as it is addressed in this paper. A benefit 
of a larger, interconnected system is, however, more stability, as the relative impact of 
individual generators and capacity additions becomes smaller. 
                                                 
1 Many markets are dominated by a few large suppliers. For example, the French, Belgian, Portuguese, Italian, 
Greek, Danish and Irish markets are dominated by one or two generators, while only three or four producers 
serve two-thirds or more of the markets in Germany, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain (see the article 
“EU energy markets face cohesion barriers” in Power Europe (4), 4 January 2002.                                                                                                                                       11 
In practice, interconnected electricity systems often have quite different market rules; the 
rules for using interconnectors are different from the regular transmission-access rules within 
the systems. Therefore, the markets that function within the interconnected systems are not 
fully integrated, but incompletely linked. This has repercussions upon the generation 
adequacy in the different markets. 
In the case of California, for instance, part of the problem was that investment in generation 
was not only lagging in California itself, but also in neighboring states. There, however, it did 
not lead to a shortage, but to a reduction of capacity reserves. When the weather suddenly 
caused a shortage, these states used their own generation resources to meet their own demand 
first, selling to California only what excess electricity was left. As a result, California, the 
importing state, bore the full brunt of a crisis, the roots of which were actually spread among 
a number of states. 
In the European Union, a similar scenario is possible. Article 23 of the Directive allows 
member states ‘in the event of a sudden crisis’ to take unspecified ‘safeguard measures’ 
(Directive 96/92/EC).
2 This can be interpreted as giving member states the right to close 
down interconnectors temporarily in an emergency. Although there may be sound technical 
reasons for doing so, this means that in the case of a crisis, the EU internal market may fall 
apart into a number of disconnected national markets. With respect to generation adequacy, 
this is an important issue, as each country should thus have sufficient reserves of its own to 
guarantee adequate supply under adverse conditions.  
9 Risk  asymmetry 
The experience of California shows that the social costs of deviating from the optimum can be 
high. The outages in California totaled 30 hours, spread over six days. The largest amount of 
electricity not served at any given time was 1000 MWh, although much of the time the 
outages affected a much smaller volume of load (Hawkins, 2001). To place these figures in 
perspective: during 0.3% of the year, a maximum of 2% of electricity demand was not served. 
Despite the seemingly small proportion of time in which outages actually occurred, the 
estimated social costs of the crisis are $45 billion (Weare, 2003). 
Clearly, a relatively small deficiency of the system can have significant, negative social 
consequences. This observation is corroborated by efforts to estimate the value of lost load, 
which is the cost to customers of not being served with electricity. The value of lost load is 
usually estimated to be some two orders of magnitude higher than regular electricity prices, 
i.e. well in excess of €1000/MWh, although it is difficult to estimate accurately (Willis & 
Garrod, 1997). For example, in Australia the value of lost load was determined at 20,000 
AUS$/MWh, which is about €11,000/MWh (Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, 2000). 
From these considerations, the conclusion may be drawn that the provision of electricity is 
characterised by a strongly asymmetric loss-of-welfare curve. The loss-of-welfare owing to 
underinvestment by a certain amount is higher in order of magnitude than the loss-of-welfare 
owing to overinvestment by the same amount.
3 In this view, the likelihood of 
                                                 
2 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity, Official Journal 1997 L 27, pp. 20-29. 
3 For a similar view with respect to transmission capacity, see Hirst (2000). 12  
 
underinvestment because of the factors described in the previous section is a serious risk, 
which it is worth considerable cost to avoid. 
Two strategies to reduce the risk of underinvestment to society can be proposed. One is to 
deliberately over-invest in the electricity system. While the overinvestment would constitute a 
loss-of-welfare with respect to the social optimum, it can be considered as a social insurance 
against the much greater risk of underinvestment. The second strategy is to ‘flatten’ the 
investment optimum by changing the dynamics of the electricity system. If demand can be 
made more responsive to price, a shortage would result less quickly in random rationing and 
extreme prices. Instead, the least-valuable loads would first reduce their demand. This would 
reduce the social cost of a shortage from the average value of lost load to the value of lost 
load of the least valuable customers. 
10 Capacity  mechanisms 
Despite the lack of consensus whether there is a problem, several solutions have been 
developed, some of which have been implemented.  
Mothball reserve 
One option that often is proposed is a so-called ‘mothball reserve’, a collection of mothballed, 
old plants that can be returned to service if necessary. The question is under what conditions 
this reserve is deployed. If the market is to perform its regular task and invest in generation 
capacity, it should be able to rely upon periodical price spikes to finance its investment in 
peaking units. This means that the reserve should only be deployed at a high price, namely a 
price equal to the value of lost load. This raises two issues. First, it may be politically 
unsustainable to allow prices to rise this high for any length of time if they can be lowered by 
deploying the mothball reserve. After all, the reserve will be something of a public facility. 
The second issue is that the incentive to withhold capacity by market parties will not be 
eliminated until the deployment price of the mothball reserve is reached. Nevertheless, if the 
reserve is to be deployed at any lower price, it will reduce the incentive to invest. This 
scenario would create a need for a larger reserve. 
Capacity payments 
A better prospect is offered by methods that convert the irregular revenues from price spikes 
to a constant revenue stream for generation companies. A primitive form consists of capacity 
payments, as tried in Spain and several South-American countries and, in a different form, in 
the former England and Wales Pool. A disadvantage of these payments is that their effect is 
uncertain: the payments do not necessarily lead to more investment. Instead of fixing the 
payment level and leaving the investment level to be decided by the generation market, it is 
more effective to do the reverse. The most promising capacity mechanisms provide a clear 
signal to the generation market regarding the demand for capacity, but leave it to the market 
to finance it. 
Capacity requirements 
The only system that has been tried in practice and that appears to work is the system of 
capacity requirements, such as the installed capacity (ICAP) system used by PJM on the US 
East Coast. (For an introduction, see for instance Besser et al., 2002.) In this system, the retail                                                                                                                                                                               13 
companies are required to purchase a certain percentage of reserve capacity. The percentage is 
determined by the regulator. This reveals the demand for reserve capacity. The cost of 
providing the reserve capacity is passed along to the consumers by the retail companies who 
contract the capacity. The reserve capacity is tradable and may consist of an interruptible 
load. 
Reliability contracts 
A disadvantage of capacity requirements is that they do not provide an incentive to maximise 
the availability of reserve capacity. An improvement in this respect is provided by reliability 
contracts, a system of call options that the system operator purchases from the generation 
companies (Vázquez et al., 2002). When the options are called, the producers are required to 
pay the system operator the difference between the market price and the strike price. 
Operating power plants are a perfect hedge for the generators: their net income is equal to the 
strike price. Generation companies that have sold options that are not covered by available 
generation capacity when the options are called, lose on those options. This provides 
generation companies with an incentive to sell an option volume that is equal to the available 
volume of the generation capacity that they control. A second advantage is that the generation 
companies receive an incentive to maximise the availability of their generation units during 
periods of scarcity. Overall generation adequacy is determined by the system operator, by the 
volume of options that the operator purchases. 
Capacity subscriptions 
Where the previous two systems still contain an element of central coordination, a system of 
capacity subscriptions leaves all variables to the market (Doorman, 2000). In fact, this system 
may be considered more market-oriented than a traditional, unregulated electricity market, 
because it allows consumers to choose their level of generation adequacy. In this system, each 
customer needs to purchase an electronic fuse, which can limit his/her electricity use. The 
fuses are activated by the system operator during periods of scarcity. Customers can choose 
the size of their fuses. The fuses are sold by generation companies and need to be covered by 
available generation capacity. Thus, the market for fuses indicates the total demand for 
generation capacity and provides generation companies with fixed revenues to cover their 
investments. This system turns the security of supply into a private good: consumers can 
choose their own level of generation capacity that they want to have reliably available. The 
drawback of this system, compared with the previous options, is that it is more elaborate, as it 
requires the installation of an electronic fuse at each customer site. 
A final option is not to end the consumer franchise (Newbery, 2002). With captive 
consumers, the free-rider problem is solved. Then the retail companies can cover their full 
projected demand with long-term contracts. But this option will not prove popular with those 
in favor of a fully liberalised market. 
The discussed capacity mechanisms all have the limitation that they have limited effect when 
they are implemented in the presence of significant import volumes. To be both effective and 
economically efficient, an interconnected system would need to implement a capacity 
mechanism for its whole area. 14 
 
11 Conclusions 
In theory, it appears that there is sufficient incentive for generators in an energy-only market 
to invest in capacity. The recovery of investments, however, would depend upon a small 
chance of earning high returns during periodic episodes of power shortage. This delicate 
balance between investment and expected returns may easily be upset by a number of factors, 
some of which appear inevitable. Long-term contracts do not provide a solution, as there is an 
opportunity for consumers to free-ride the system and the required contract length is too great. 
Therefore, it appears likely that energy-only electricity markets will tend to lead to a shortfall 
of generation capacity over time, possibly resulting in investment cycles. 
A second disadvantage of relying upon periodical price spikes to signal the need for 
investment in generation capacity is that these price spikes can be manipulated by generation 
companies. This possibility dilutes their effectiveness as an investment signal. Worse, it may 
result in large transfers of income from consumers to producers and reduces the operational 
reliability of electricity supply during these price spikes. Several methods have been proposed 
to stabilise the market and provide better incentives to generation companies and consumers 
alike. The main effect of these methods is to make the demand for reserve capacity explicit, 
which reduces the investment risk for generation companies. For consumers, the benefits are 
better security of supply and lower price volatility.   15 
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